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Istilāʾ 
 
The term imārat al-istilāʾ (“emirate by usurpation”)—istilāʾ for short—can be best 
understood by placing it within a historical context. Our starting point is with the jurist and 
political theoretician Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī al-Māwardī (d. 1058), whose political position, as 
well as the events through which he lived, are key to contextualizing its importance. Al-
Māwardī lived through the ʿAbbāsid caliphate in decline and witnessed the rising power of 
Shīʿī Būyids and Seljuk Turks. 
 In al-Māwardī’s most renowned work, al-Aḥkām al-sulṭānīya (On the principles of 
power or On the ordinances of government), one finds his elaboration of istilāʾ as part of an 
impressive, comprehensive, and ground-breaking theory of the State. Here al-Māwardī 
explains that there are two distinct types of emirate: istilāʾ or istikfā (“by designation”), 
authority invested in an individual by the caliph, according to the latter’s free choice. In the 
case of istilāʾ, al-Māwardī states that although the emir acquires territory by force, rather than 
being given it by the caliph to administer, the authority that the emir possesses to rule over 
this territory is nonetheless conferred upon him, ex post facto, by the caliph. One can see how 
this accommodates both parties—the emir in that his seizure of power is not contested, but is 
rather given further political and spiritual validation by the somewhat symbolic gesture of the 
investiture of authority, and the caliph in that he maintains his authority even if, in real and 
practical terms, this is emblematic. This reflects al-Māwardī’s belief that a strong caliphate as 
a unifying force for Muslims was important and that authority rests with the caliphate. The 
caliph, however, is held accountable to a “higher power,” that of religious norms, as is the 
emir who acquired his emirate through istilāʾ.  
 At the time of al-Māwardī, a number of new political entities, the Ṣafavids, the 
Ghaznavids, and the Ṭāhirids, emerged along with the Būyids; all represented forms of power 
politics that undermined the authority and, for that matter, the necessity, of the caliph. Given 
the ascendency of these new, autonomous dynasties, istilāʾ concerned al-Māwardī: how could 
politics governed by physical power be transformed into legitimate authority, and what would 
be the role of religion and the caliph in all this? In al-Aḥkām al-sulṭānīya, al-Māwardī 
outlines seven carefully formulated conditions as a result of the investiture of the caliph, 
which, if abided by, would make istilāʾ acceptable. In short, these conditions require the emir 
to acknowledge the caliph as trustee of religion, “the defender of the faith,” and, in 
consequence, for the emir to abide by established juridical and religious norms in the same 
way that the caliph must. While Sharīʿah was one way of checking the power of an emir, al-
Māwardī was aware that it could not always provide the answers to changing circumstances. 
With the establishment of a redress of grievances court (maẓālim), which maneuvered within 
the Sharīʿah but had wider and more unfettered powers, al-Māwardī hoped that an emir’s 
power could be checked.  
 A century later, the concept of istilāʾ was well established (Brackney, p. 175) even 
though the philosopher, jurist, and theologian Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) recognizes 
only too well that the emirs paid little attention or, at best, lip service to the caliph and the 
religious dictates of the ʿulamaʾ. Whereas for al-Māwardī the practical affairs of state 
(siyāsah or siyāsat al-dunyā) are subordinate to religion (dīn), at least in certain matters, for 
al-Ghazālī there is a subtler intertwining of the two—he sees the world we live in as a 
preparation (zād) for the happiness of the hereafter, and the attainment of happiness requires 
knowledge (ʿilm) of God. However, al-Ghazālī is very practical in accepting the need for 
compromise, sharing with al-Māwardī the fear of the alternative, namely, revolution, which 
would only result in chaos and further undermining of any form of social cohesion. Al-
Ghazālī notes that accession to the caliphate itself might be the result of a physical, military 
seizure of power and that religious legitimacy is not enough to remain in power, given that it 
is sustained through military might. With this empirical observation of the role of military 
power and istilāʾ, al-Ghazālī argues that merely by ensuring that the caliph’s name is 
mentioned in the sermon in Friday congregational prayers (the khuṭba) and is also on the 
coinage, an emir has sufficed to profess allegiance to the caliph.  
 Such Realpolitik must necessarily lead to the declaration that istilāʾ is an entirely 
legitimate form of governance, which next step came about with the dissolution of the 
ʿAbbāsid caliphate in 1258 by the Mongols and the establishment of the “shadow caliphate” 
of the Mamlūks in Cairo. The chief qāḍī of Cairo under the Mamlūks was the Shāfiʿī jurist 
Ibn Jamāʿah (d. 1333) who, in his Taḥrīr al-aḥkām (Summary of the rules for the governance 
of the people of Islam), cites a saying of the second Rightly Guided caliph ʿUmar Ibn al-
Khaṭṭāb (d. 644), “we are with whomever happens to emerge victorious,” to support the right 
of the Mamlūks—or any other who deposed a power through military might—to be the just 
ruler, on the basis that this is best for the well-being and unity of Muslims. This emphasis on 
unity and order over that of legitimacy highlights the perennial debate as to whether an 
oppressive caliph could be overthrown: Sunnī traditions going back to the theologian and 
jurist Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 855) argue that even if the caliph is a usurper he should be obeyed 
unless he commits apostasy (EI2, 3: 1164b).  
 Such suggestions of the possibility that the caliph himself may be a usurper provide 
grist to the mill for Shīʿī ʿulamaʾ to assert the genuine authority of the Imams (Lambton, p. 
252). In the thirteenth century, the Shīʿī philosopher and theologian Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 
1274), writing at the time of the ascendancy of the Seljuk dynasty, states that although the 
true ruler may be presently “hidden,” in the meantime Muslims can be ruled by the “just 
sultan” or the “sultan of the time” until the return of the twelfth imam (Madelung, p. 30). 
 While harboring a vision of an ideal caliphate is all well and good, accepting the 
reality of the political climate in which istilāʾ was a too common occurrence frequently 
therefore asserted itself. Al-Ghazālī’s search for a compromise between the ideal and the 
reality through the establishment of a “balance” (tawāzun), or a middle way, was furthered by 
the Delhi-born Islamic scholar and “renewer” (mujaddid) Shāh Walī Allāh al-Dihlawī (d. 
1762), a member of the Naqshbandī order, who brought a Ṣūfī ingredient into the mix, partly 
as an attempt to reconcile the seeming differences between Ṣūfī mysticism and orthodox 
legalism. In his Ḥujjat Allāh al-bāligha (Conclusive arguments from God), Shāh Walī Allāh 
presents us with a theory of natural law in which the human species goes through a series of 
“stages” (irtifāqāt) from the most basic, small society in the first stage to the fourth stage of a 
large domain ruled by a caliph. He argues for the necessity of the authority of the caliph in 
the fourth stage to maintain order: he “has an army and equipment which make it clearly 
impossible for someone else to usurp his domain” (Hermansen, p. 137). Shāh Walī Allāh 
acknowledges that because there can be no prophets after the Prophet Muḥammad, the best 
we can expect from a caliph is that he upholds religious law—the ʿAbbāsids set the bar and 
the caliph Maḥmūd of Ghazna (r. 998–1030) is the finest example. The expectations for the 
ruler may now be lowered, but the emphasis is still on the observance of the Sharīʿah; failure 
to do this justifies rebellion and istilāʾ to force a return to Islamic law and order.  
 Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb (d. 1792), Shāh Walī Allāh’s contemporary, 
confirmed Muḥammad Ibn Saʿūd in 1744 to be the political leader of the Muslim state 
(imāma) and for all his future descendants to also be imāms. Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, who 
continued as the religious leader, states that there are two mechanisms for the establishment 
of political rule: taʿyīn (appointment) and istilāʾ, although a third principle, shūrā 
(consultation), should be given some force. He clarifies that citizens must “listen to and obey 
the ruler, even if he is a despot (jāʾir) and debauched (fāsiq), as long as he does not order 
people to disobey God. People should gather round the one who assumes the caliphate and 
accept him. If he got the caliphate with his sword (istilāʾ), he should be obeyed. Rebellion 
against a usurper is forbidden” (trans. al-Rasheed, p. 46). The only form of despotism that Ibn 
ʿAbd al-Wahhāb regards as unacceptable is that which seeks to change or divert from God’s 
law. While the Wahhābīyah is in a number of respects unique as an Islamic movement, its 
ideology emphasizes with the rest of Islamic political thought the necessity of maintaining 
God’s law above all else, although who has the authority to interpret this can differ 
considerably from one school of thought to another.  
 The issue of ultimate authority resting with God’s law raises the question for the need 
for a caliphate at all, which is echoed by such modern-day thinkers as Rashīd Riḍā (d. 1935), 
who in his al-Khilāfa aw al-imāma al-ʿuẓmā (The caliphate or the great imamate, 1934) 
argues that election and consultation are and always have been basic principles of Islam, even 
before they existed in Western Europe. With the abolition of the caliphate in 1924, the 
obedience of Muslims was seen as directed only toward God. The issue of usurpation ceased 
to be an Islamic issue. Further, with the rise of Muslim activism and such figures as the 
Iranian ʿAlī Sharīʿatī (d. 1977), the notion of istilāʾ became no longer that of a ruler usurping 
the rule of another, but a revolutionary call for the Muslim community as a whole to 
overthrow forms of oppression. 
 
[See also Ghazālī, Abū Ḥāmid al; Mamlūk State; Māwardī, Abū al-Ḥasan al-; Maẓālim; 
Sharīʿatī, ʿAlī; Tyranny; ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb; Wahhābīyah.] 
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